

Hong Kong Security Watch Report

2017 Q4

Foreword

Better Security Decision with Situational Awareness

Nowadays, a lot of "invisible" compromised systems (computers and other devices) are controlled by attackers with the owner being unaware. The data on these systems may be mined and exposed every day, and the systems may be utilized in different kinds of abuse and criminal activities. The Hong Kong Security Watch Report aims to provide the public a better "visibility" of the situation of the compromised systems in Hong Kong so that they can make better decision in protecting their information security.

The data in this report is about the activities of compromised systems in Hong Kong which suffer from, or participate in various forms of cyber attacks, including web defacement, phishing, malware hosting, botnet command and control centres (C&C) or bots. Computers in Hong Kong are defined as those whose network geolocation is Hong Kong, or the top level domain of their host name is ".hk".

Capitalizing on the Power of Global Intelligence

This report is the fruit of the collaboration of HKCERT and global security researchers. Many security researchers have the capability to detect attacks targeting their own or their customers' networks. Some of them provide the information of IP addresses of attack source or web links of malicious activities to other information security organizations with an aim to collaboratively improve the overall security of the cyberspace. They have good practice in sanitizing personal identifiable data before sharing information.

HKCERT collects and aggregates such valuable data about Hong Kong from multiple information sources for analysis with Information Feed Analysis System (IFAS), a system developed by HKCERT. The information sources (Appendix 1) are very distributed and reliable, providing a balanced reflection of the security status of Hong Kong.

We remove duplicated events reported by multiple sources and use the following metrics for measurement to assure the quality of statistics.

Better information better service

We will continue to enhance this report with more valuable information sources and more in-depth analysis. We will also explore how to use the data to enhance our services. *Please send us your feedback via email* (*hkcert@hkcert.org*).

Limitations

The data collected in this report is from multiple different sources with different collection method, collection period, presentation format and their own limitations. The numbers from the report should be used as a reference, and should neither be compared directly nor be regarded as a full picture of the reality.

Type of Attack	Metric used
Defacement, Phishing,	security events on unique URLs within the
Malware Hosting	reporting period
Botnet (C&Cs)	security events on unique IP addresses within
	the reporting period
Botnet (Bots)	maximum daily count of security events on
	unique IP addresses within the reporting period

Disclaimer

Data may be subject to update and correction without notice. We shall not have any liability, duty or obligation for or relating to the content and data contained herein, any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or delays in the content and data, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon. In no event shall we be liable for any special, incidental or consequential damages, arising out of the use of the content and data.

License

The content of this report is provided under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. You may share and adopt the content for any purpose, provided that you attribute the work to HKCERT.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

Contents

Hi	Iighlights of Report 5					
Re	eport Details	10				
1	Defacement 1.1 Summary	10 10				
2	Phishing 2.1 Summary	12 12				
3	Malware Hosting 3.1 Summary	14 14				
4	Botnet 4.1 Botnets - Command & Control Servers	16 16 17 17				
Aŗ	opendix	18				
A	A Sources of information in IFAS					
в	3 Geolocation identification methods in IFAS 1					
С	C Major Botnet Families 20					

 $^{^{-1}}$ Major Botnet Families are selected botnet families with considerable amount of security events reported from the information sources constantly across the reporting period.

Highlight of Report

This report is for 2017 Q4.

In 2017 Q4, there were 7,735 unique security events related to Hong Kong used for analysis in this report. The information is collected with $IFAS^2$ from 19 sources of information.³ They are not from the incidents reports received by HKCERT.



Trend of Security events

Figure 1: Trend of security events

The total number of security events in 2017 Q4 dropped by 10% or 784 events compared to the previous quarter. The decrease was mostly contributed by the decrease in both phishing and botnet events. In 2017 Q1, we had 15,365 events. It dropped significantly in Q2 by 41% and continued to decrease steadily in Q3 and Q4.

Server related security events

Server related security events include malware hosting, phishing and defacement. Their trends and distributions are summarized below:

 $^{^{2}}$ IFAS - Information Feed Analysis System is a HKCERT developed system that collects global security intelligence relating to Hong Kong to provide a picture of the security status.

³Refer to Appendix 1 for the sources of information

Malware hosting Phishing 8000 Defacement 1920 6000 2049 4738 4000 1957 1226 1270 2000 1100 4482 1324 2016 04 2017 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 2017 04

Trend and Distribution of server related security events

Figure 2: Trend and distribution of server related security events

The number of server related security events decreased from 3,386 to 3,043 (decreased by 10%) in this quarter. Though the overall count decreased, the number of defacement was actually increased by 25%. If comparing with all quarters in 2017, the number of events is in decreasing trend, with the number of defacement events drops significantly during the year.

The URL/IP ratio of malware hosting events continued to increase to a very high value of 16, with the number of unique URL slightly increased from 1,226 to 1,270, and the number of unique IP decreased from 102 to 77, or by 25%. When comparing with both Q1 and Q2 in 2017, it can be seen that the number of unique IP decreased from 369 to 97, and then decreased to 77 in Q4. That means fewer servers are used for malware hosting.

HKCERT urges system and application administrators to protect the servers



Botnet related security events

Botnet related security events can be classified into two categories:

• Botnet Command and Control Centers (C&C) security events - involving small number of powerful computers, mostly servers, which give commands to bots

• Botnet security events - involving large number of computers, mostly home computers which receive commands from C&Cs.

Botnet Command and Control Servers

The trend of botnet C&C security events is summarized below:



Trend of Botnet (C&C) security events

Figure 3: Trend of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

The number of botnet Command and Control Servers was doubled to 2 in this quarter. Both of them were identified as an IRC bot C&C server.

Botnet Bots

The trend of botnet (bots) security events is summarized below:

Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events



Figure 4: Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events

Although the number of Botnet (bots) on Hong Kong network decreased by 9% in Q4 2017, the count of WannaCry family remains steady, slightly increase by 2%. WannaCry ransomware outbreak occurred in May 2017. The WannaCry-bots are machines infected by WannaCry ransomware with the encryption mechanism not activated. HKCERT had handled 1,210 cases for WannaCry-bot in 2017 to try to clean up these machines infected by malware.

Mirai botnet became active in end 2016. Global security organizations started to clean up in 2017 Q1. The number of events dropped sharply from 2,493 in Q1 to 746 in Q2 and steadily decreased in Q3 and Q4. HKCERT had handled 151 cases about Mirai botnet to eliminate its effect.

The drops of the families Ghost push and Pushdo were large, with 76% and 62% respectively.

WannaCry

Ransomware is a type of malware which will encrypt a victim's files and demand a ransom in order to recover the files.

The 'WannaCry' variant possesses a worm's characteristic and is the first ransomware which can spread across home or office networks to infect much more devices by exploiting Microsoft Windows SMB vulnerabilities (EternalBlue and DoublePulsar). It scans for open TCP ports 139 and 445 on unpatched hosts and once detected, starts the nasty work to encrypt the files and propagate itself within the network.



- patch their computers
- install a working copy of the security software and scan for malware on their machines
- set strong passwords to avoid credential based attack
- do not use Windows, media files and software that have no proper licenses
- do not use Windows and software that have no security updates
- $\bullet\,$ do not open files from unreliable sources

HKCERT has been following up the security events received and proactively engaged local ISPs for the botnet clean up since June 2013. Currently, botnet clean up operations against major botnet family WannaCry, Avalanche, XCodeGhost, Pushdo, Citadel, Mumblehard, Ramnit, ZeroAccess and GameOver Zeus are still in action.

HKCERT urges general users to join the cleanup acts. Ensure your computers are not being infected and controlled by malicious software. Protect yourself and keep the cyberspace clean.

Users can use the HKCERT guideline to detect and clean up botnets



- Botnet Detection and Cleanup Guideline
- https://www.hkcert.org/botnet

Report Details

1 Defacement

1.1 Summary



Trend of Defacement security events

Figure 5: Trend of Defacement security events

What is defacement?

• Defacement is the unauthorized alteration of the content of a legitimate website using hacking method.

What are the potential impacts?

- The integrity of the website content is damaged.
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might be damaged
- Other information stored/processed on the server might be further compromised by the hack to performed other attacks.

URL/IP ratio of Defacement security events



Figure 6: URL/IP ratio of defacement security events

What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

• Zone-H

2 Phishing

2.1 Summary



Trend of Phishing security events

Figure 7: Trend of Defacement security events

What is Phishing?

• Phishing is the spoofing of a legitimate website for fraudulent purposes



What are the potential impacts?

- Personal information or accout credentials of visitors might be stolen, leading to financial loss.
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might the damaged
- Server might be further compromised to perform other attacks

URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events



Figure 8: URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events

What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

- ArborNetwork Atlas SRF
- CleanMX phishing
- Millersmiles
- Phishtank

3 Malware Hosting

3.1 Summary



Trend of Malware security events

Figure 9: Trend of Malware Hosting security events

What is Malware Hosting?

• Malware Hosting is the dispatching of malware on a website

What are the potential impacts?

- Visitors might download and install the malware, or execute the malicious script to get compromised
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might the damaged
- Server might be further compromised to perform other criminal activities

URL/IP ratio of Malware security events



Figure 10: URL/IP ratio of Malware Hosting security events



What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

- Abuse.ch:Zeus Tracker Binary URL
- Abuse.ch:SpyEye Tracker Binary URL
- CleanMX Malware
- Malc0de
- MalwareDomainList
- Sacour.cn

4 Botnet

4.1 Botnets - Command & Control Servers



Trend and Distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

Figure 11: Trend and Distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

What is a Botnet Command & Control Center?

• A Botnet Command & Control Center is a server used by cybercriminals to control the bots, which are compromised computers, by sending them commands to perform malicious activities, e.g. stealing personal financial information or launching DDoS attacks

What are the potential impacts?

- Server might be heavily loaded when many bots connect to it
- Server might contain large amount of personal and financial data stolen by other bots

- Zeus Tracker
- SpyEye Tracker
- Palevo Tracker
- Shadowserver C&Cs

4.2**Botnets - Bots**

Major Botnet Families⁴ 4.2.1

Individual botnet's size is calculated from the maximum of the daily counts of unique IP address attempting to connect to the botnet in the report period. In other words, the real botnet size should be larger because not all bots are powered on the same day.



Figure 12: Major Botnet Families in Hong Kong Networks

Rank	$\Uparrow \Downarrow \textbf{Concerned Bots}$		Number of Unique	Changes with
			IP addresses	previous period
1	\rightarrow	WannaCry	2001	2.1%
2	\rightarrow	Conficker	1180	-12.0%
3	\rightarrow	Mirai	611	9.5%
4	\rightarrow	Avalanche	246	-12.5%
5	\rightarrow	Sality	170	-13.3%
6	↑	ZeroAccess	85	-12.4%
7	↑	Murofet	66	-29.8%
8	↑	Palevo	44	-38.9%
9	\Downarrow	Ghost push	32	-76.1%
10	\Downarrow	Pushdo	31	-62.2%

m 11 0 ъ*г* • ъ . . • 1 • ъτ

⁴Major Botnet Families are selected botnet families with considerable amount of security events reported from the information sources constantly across the reporting period.



Trend of 5 Botnet Families in Hong Kong Network

Figure 13: Trend of Top 5 Botnet Families in Hong Kong Network

Name	2016 Q4	2017 Q1	$2017~\mathrm{Q2}$	2017 Q3	2017 Q4
WannaCry	0	0	1566	1959	2001
Conficker	1360	2972	1381	1341	1180
Mirai	1932	2493	746	558	611
Avalanche	374	443	337	281	246
Sality	150	144	199	196	170

What is a Botnet - Bot?

• A bot is usually a personal computer that is infected by malicious software to become part of a botnet. Once infected, the malicious software usually hides itself, and stealthily connects to the Command & Control Server to get instructions from hackers.

What are the potential impacts?

- Computer owner's personal and financial data might be stolen which may lead to financial loss.
- Computers might be commanded to perform other criminal activities.

- ArborNetwork Atlas SRF conficker
- ShadowServer botnet_drone
- ShadowServer sinkhole_http_drone
- Shadowserver Microsoft_sinkhole

Appendix

A Sources of information in IFAS

The following information feeds are information sources of IFAS:

Event Type	Source	First introduced
Defacement	Zone - H	2013-04
Phishing	ArborNetwork: Atlas SRF-Phishing	2013-04
Phishing	CleanMX - Phishing	2013-04
Phishing	Millersmiles	2013-04
Phishing	Phishtank	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - Binary URL	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Abuse.ch: SpyEye Tracker - Binary URL	2013-04
Malware Hosting	CleanMX - Malware	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Malc0de	2013-04
Malware Hosting	MalwareDomainList	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Savour.cn	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - C&Cs	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Abuse.ch: SpyEye Tracker - C&Cs	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Abuse.ch: Palevo Tracker - C&Cs	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Shadowserver - C&Cs	2013-09
Botnet (Bots)	Arbor Network: Atlas SRF-Conficker	2013-08
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - botnet_drone	2013-08
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - sinkhole_http_drone	2013-08
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - microsoft_sinkhole	2013-08

B Geolocation identification methods in IFAS

We use the following methods to identify if a network's geolocation is in Hong Kong:

Table 4: Methods of Geolocation Identification					
Method	First introduced	Last update			
Maxmind	2013-04	2018-1-5			

C Major Botnet Families

Major Botnets	Alias	<u>Table 5: Bo</u> Nature	tnet Families Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Avalanche	Nil	Crimeware-as-	Depends on underlying	send spams
	1 (11	a-service	malwares	 host phishing sites
				 host malware
				• steal sensitive information
Bamital	Nil	Trojan	• drive-by download via	• Click fraud
			exploit kit	• Search hijacking
			• via P2P network	
BankPatch	• MultiBanker	Banking Trojan	• via adult web sites	• monitor specific
	• Patcher		• corrupt multimedia	banking websites and
	• BankPatcher		codecs	harvest user's
			• spam e-mail	passwords, credit card
			• chat and messaging	information and other
Beden	Nil	Trojan	• via adult web sites	Click fraud
Dedep	111	mojan	 malvertising 	 download other malwares
BlackEnergy	Nil	DDoS Trojan	• rootkit techniques to	launch DDoS attacks
80			maintain persistence	
			• uses process injection	
			technique	
			• strong encryption and	
			modular architecture	
Citadel	Nil	Banking Trojan	• avoid and disable	• steal banking
			security tool detection	credentials and
				sensitive information
				• keystroke logging
				 screensnot capture video capturo
				• man-in-the browser
				attack
				 ransomware
Conficker	• Downadup	Worm	• domain generation	• exploit the Windows
	• Kido		algorithm (DGA)	Server Service
			capability	vulnerability (MS08-067)
			• communicate via P2P	• brute force attacks
			network	for admin credential to
			• disable security	spread across network
			software	• spread via removable
				drives using "autorun"
				teature

Table 6: Botnet Families (cont.)					
Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts	
Corebot	Nil	Banking Trojan	• via droppers	 steal sensitive information install other malware backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access 	
Dyre	Nil	Banking Trojan	• spam e-mail	 steal banking credential by tricking the victim to call an illegitimate number send spams 	
Gamarue	• Andromeda	Downloader/ Worm	 via exploit kit spam e-mail MS Word macro removable-drives 	 steal sensitive information allow unauthorized access install other malware 	
Ghost Push	Nil	Mobile malware	• via app installation	gain root accessdownload other malware	
Glupteba	Nil	Trojan	• drive-by download via Blackhole Exploit Kit	• push contextual advertising and clickjacking to victims	
IRC Botnet	Nil	Trojan	• communicate via IRC network	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access launch DDoS attack send spams 	
Mirai	Nil	Worm	• telnet with vendor default credentials	• launch DDoS attacks	
Murofet	Nil	Trojan	file infectionvia exploit kits	• download other malware	
Nivdort	Nil	Trojan	• spam e-mail	• steal login credentials and sensitive information	
Nymaim	Nil	Trojan	spam e-mailmalicious link	 lock infected systems stop victims from accessing files ask for ransom 	
Palevo	 Rimecud Butterfly bot Pilleuz Mariposa Vaklik 	Worm	• spread via instant messaging, P2P network and removable drives	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access steal login credentials and sensitive information steal money directly from banks using money mules 	

		Table 7: Bothe	t Fammes (cont.)	
Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Pushdo	CutwailPandex	Downloader	 hiding its malicious network traffic domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability distribute via drive by download exploit browser and plugins' vulnerabilities 	 download other banking malware (e.g. Zeus and Spyeye) launch DDoS attacks send spams
Ramnit	Nil	Worm	file infectionvia exploit kitspublic FTP servers	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access steal login credentials and sensitive information
Sality	Nil	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence communicate via P2P network spread via removable drives and shares disable security software use polymorphic and entry point obscuring (EPO) techniques to infect files 	 send spams proxying of communications steal sensitive information compromise web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking) install other malware
Slenfbot	Nil	Worm	• spread via removable drives and shares	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access download financial malware sending spam launch DDoS attacks
Tinba	TinyBankerZusy	Banking Trojan	via exploit kitSpam e-mail	• steal banking credential and sensitive information
Torpig	SinowalAnserin	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence (Mebroot rootkit) domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability distribute via drive by download 	 steal sensitive information man in the browser attack

Table 8: Botnet Families (cont.)					
Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts	
Virut	Nil	Trojan	• spread via removable drives and shares	send spamslaunch DDoS attacksfrauddata theft	
WannaCry	• WannaCrypt	Ransomware	spread across networkexploit Windows SMB vulnerabilities	 encrypt user data demand ransom data unrecoverable	
Wapomi	Nil	Worm	 spread via removable drives and shares infects executable files 	 backdoor capabilities download and drop additional destructive payloads alter important files causing unreliable system performance gather computer activity, transmit private data and cause sluggish computer 	
ZeroAccess	max++Sirefef	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence communicate via P2P network distribute via drive by download distribute via disguise as legitimate file (eg. media files, keygen) 	 download other malware bitcoin mining and click fraud 	
Zeus	• Gameover	Banking Trojan	 stealthy techniques to maintain persistence distribute via drive by download communicate via P2P network 	 steal banking credential and sensitive information man in the browser attack keystroke logging download other malware (eg. Cryptolocker) launch DDoS attacks 	