

Hong Kong Security Watch Report

2020 Q2

Release date: Aug 2020

Foreword

Better Security Decision with Situational Awareness

Nowadays, many networked digital devices, such as computers, smartphones, tablets, are being compromised without the user's knowledge. The data on them may be mined and exposed every day, and even be used for various criminal activities.

The Hong Kong Security Watch Report aims to raise public awareness of the problem of compromised systems in Hong Kong, enabling them to make better decision in information security. The data in this quarterly report focuses on the activities of compromised systems in Hong Kong which suffer from, or have participated in various types of cyber attacks, including web defacement, phishing, malware hosting, botnet command and control centres (C&C) or bots. "Computers in Hong Kong" refer to those whose network geolocation is Hong Kong, or the top level domain of their host name is ".hk".

Capitalising on the Power of Global Intelligence

This report is the result of collaboration between the Hong Kong Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre (HKCERT) and global security researchers. Many security researchers have the ability to detect attacks against their own or clients' networks. Some will provide the collected information of IP addresses of attack source or web links of malicious activities to other information security organisations with an aim to collectively improve the overall security of the cyberspace. They have good practice in sanitising personal identifiable data before sharing the information.

HKCERT collects and aggregates such data about Hong Kong from multiple information sources for analysis with the Information Feed Analysis System (IFAS), a system developed by HKCERT. The information sources (Appendix 1) are very diverse and reliable, providing a balanced reflection of the security status of Hong Kong.

HKCERT remove duplicated events reported by multiple sources and use the following metrics for measurement to assure the quality of statistics.

| Table 1: Types of Attack | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Type of Attack | Metric used | | | |
| Defacement, Phishing, | Security events on unique URLs within the | | | |
| Malware Hosting | reporting period | | | |
| Botnet (C&Cs) | Security events on unique IP addresses within | | | |
| | the reporting period | | | |
| Botnet (Bots) | Maximum daily count of security events on | | | |
| | unique IP addresses within the reporting period | | | |

Better information better service

HKCERT will continue to enhance this report with more valuable information sources and more in-depth analysis, and explore how to best use the data to enhance our services. *Please send your feedback via email* (*hkcert@hkcert.org*).

Limitations

Data collected for this report come from multiple sources with different collection periods, presentation formats and their own limitations. The numbers from the report should be used as a reference only, and should neither be compared directly nor be regarded as a full picture of the reality.

Disclaimer

Data may be subject to update and correction without notice. We shall not have any liability, duty or obligation for or relating to the content and data contained herein, any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or delays in the content and data, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon. In no event shall we be liable for any special, incidental or consequential damages, arising out of the use of the content and data.

License

The content of this report is provided under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. You may share and adopt the content for any purpose, provided that you attribute the work to HKCERT.


http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

Contents

| Re | port Highlights | 5 |
|----|---|-----------------|
| Re | port Details | 10 |
| 1 | Defacement 1.1 Summary | 10 10 |
| 2 | Phishing 2.1 Summary | 12 12 |
| 3 | Malware Hosting | 14 |
| | 3.1 Summary | 14 |
| 4 | Botnet | 16 |
| | 4.1 Botnets Command & Control Centers (C&C) | 16 |
| | 4.2 Botnets (Bots) | 17 |
| | 4.2.1 Major Botnet Families | 17 |
| Ар | pendix | 18 |
| Α | Sources of information in IFAS | 19 |
| В | Geolocation identification methods in IFAS | 19 |
| С | Major Botnet Families | 20 |

Report Highlights

In 2020 Q2, there were 13,365 unique security events related to Hong Kong used for analysis in this report. Data were collected through IFAS¹ with 10 sources of information², and not collected from the incident reports received by HKCERT.



Trend of security events

Figure 1: Trend of security events

| Table 2: Trend of security events | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------|-------|----------------|-------|--|--|
| Event Type | Event Type 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2020 Q1 2020 Q2 | | | | | | |
| Defacement | 532 | 1,120 | 591 | 572 | 1,062 | | |
| Phishing | 1,306 | 849 | 257 | 399 | 2,017 | | |
| Malware Hosting | 48,892 | 17,273 | 1,185 | 5,445 | 4,334 | | |
| Botnet (Bots) | 11,554 | 7,078 | 7,878 | 8 <i>,</i> 017 | 5,952 | | |
| Botnet (C2) | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |


The total number of security events in the second quarter of 2020 was down 7%, from 14,433 in 2020 Q1 to 13,365 in this quarter. Although web defacement and phishing events recorded a significant rise, it was offset by a drop in botnet and malware hosting events, resulting in a slight decrease in overall events.

¹IFAS - Information Feed Analysis System is a HKCERT developed system that collects global security intelligence relating to Hong Kong to provide a picture of the security status.

²Refer to Appendix 1 for the sources of information

Server related security events

Server related security events include malware hosting, phishing and defacement. Their trends and distributions are summarized as below:



Trend and distribution of server related security events

Figure 2: Trend and distribution of server related security events

As shown in Table 2, the number of URLs involved in phishing events rose by 4 times, from 399 in 2020 Q1 to 2017 in this quarter, while the number of IP addresses involved in increased by 68% (Figure 7) correspondingly. The URL/IP ratio also doubled to 8.62 (Figure 8). As discovered, around 71% of these phishing URLs were spoofing an online gambling website. These websites do not provide any features or information as ordinary websites, but prompt for user name and password once accessed. Our observation is that the rise in phishing events is due to the COVID-19 outbreak as more people work and spend their leisure time at home, increasing the demand for online entertainment. Hackers noticed the needs and therefore create phishing websites which related to epidemic to defraud sensitive information of victims. The account would be taken over by hackers once the user enter the info.

Compared to the previous quarter, the number of defacement events increased by 85% to 1062, while the number of IP addresses involved in defacement increased by 72% to 463 (Figure 5). The highest number of URL being defaced happened on 23 Apr 2020. A total of 106 websites in the same IP address were affected. A hacker gained unauthorised access to the server and then put an ".htm"file to all websites hosted in it to show off the successful compromise. Another notable incident happened on 23 May 2020 as a total of 49 IP addresses containing 64 websites were hacked. Likewise, hacker left a special ".html" file. Based on the file name, it was believed that these 63 websites were hacked by the same threat actor. HKCERT recommends that site administrators can consider deploying a system auditing tool and setting up related checking routine or auto alert to monitor any file changes as an early detection of possible defacement attacks.

The number of malware hosting events decreased by 20% from 5,445 in 2020 Q1 to 4,334 in this quarter. Related IP address number decreased by 63% to 492 (Figure 9). The URL/IP ratio was, however, recorded a one-fold increase from 4.09 to 8.81 (Figure 10). According to the data, the website with most malwares is an unofficial site for software download. HKCERT urges users not to download any software from any unofficial sites.

HKCERT urges system and application administrators to strengthen the protection of servers



- Patch server up-to-date to avoid the known vulnerabilities being exploited
- Update web application and plugins to the latest version
- Follow best practice on user account and password management
- Implement validation check for user input and system output
- Provide strong authentication e.g. two factor authentication, administrative control interface
- Acquire information security knowledge to prevent social engineering attack


Botnet related security events

Botnet related security events can be classified into two categories:

- Botnet Command and Control Centers (C&C) security events involving a small number of powerful computers, mostly servers, which give commands to bots
- Botnet (Bots) security events involving a large number of computers, mostly personal computers which receive commands from C&Cs.

Botnet Command and Control Servers (C&C)

The trend of Botnet (C&C) security events is summarised as below:




Trend of Botnet (C&C) security events

Figure 3: Trend of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

There was no Botnet Command and Control Centers (C&C) security events in this quarter.

The trend of Botnet (Bots) security events is summarised as below:



Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events

Figure 4: Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events

The number of botnet (bots) events decreased by 25% to 5,952 in this quarter. Most botnet families had recorded a decrease. Although the Mirai bot fell by 11.3% to 3,969 in this quarter, it still topped the list in Hong Kong in terms of maximum daily count. The largest drop is the Ramnit bot which had a 99% decrease from 816 to 8 and fell out of this quarter's major botnet family chart, and a long-standing bot Tinba filled the gap. Tinba can also act as a Trojan which mainly targets banks to steal sensitive data.

The result of this quarter was counter-intuitive. Originally, it was anticipated as more people adopted work from home (WFH) arrangement during the COVID-19 outbreak, more vulnerable devices would be connected to the Internet and become victims of bot's malware. However, the result implied that the general users had increased their security awareness and had taken proper measures on malware removal. It might possibly do with the fact that WFH arrangement has made users raise their security awareness. HKCERT will keep monitoring the trend and continue with necessary botnet cleanup activities.

HKCERT urges users to take action so as not to become part of the botnets



- Patch the computer
- Install security software and scan for malware
- Set strong passwords to avoid credential based attack
- Do not use Windows, media files and software that have no proper licenses
- Do not use Windows and software that have no security updates
- Do not open files from unreliable sources

HKCERT has been following up the security events received and proactively engaged local ISPs for the botnet cleanup since June 2013. Currently, botnet cleanup operations against major botnet family Avalanche, Pushdo, Citadel, Ramnit, ZeroAccess, GameOver Zeus, VPNFilter and Mirai are still ongoing.

HKCERT urges general users to join the cleanup acts, ensuring their computers are not being infected and controlled by malicious software, and protecting their personal data for a cleaner cyberspace.

Users can follow the HKCERT guideline to detect and clean up botnets

Botnet Detection and Cleanup Guideline https://www.hkcert.org/botnet



Report Details

1 Defacement

1.1 Summary



Trend of Defacement security events

Figure 5: Trend of Defacement security events

What is defacement?

• Defacement is the unauthorised alteration of the content of a legitimate website using any hacking methods.

What are the potential impacts?

- The integrity of the website content is being damaged
- Original content may be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner may be damaged
- Other information stored/processed on the server may be further compromised by hackers to perform other attacks

URL/IP ratio of Defacement security events



Figure 6: URL/IP ratio of Defacement security events

What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?


- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

• Zone-H

2 Phishing

2.1 Summary



Trend of Phishing security events

Figure 7: Trend of Phishing security events

What is phishing?

• Phishing is the spoofing of a legitimate website for fraudulent purposes



What are the potential impacts?

- Personal information or account credentials of visitors may be stolen, potentially leading to financial losses
- Original content may be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner may be damaged
- Server may be further compromised to perform other attacks

URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events



Figure 8: URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events

What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?


- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

- CleanMX phishing
- Phishtank

3 Malware Hosting

3.1 Summary



Trend of Malware Hosting security events

Figure 9: Trend of Malware Hosting security events

What is malware hosting?

• Malware hosting is the dispatching of malware on a website



What are the potential impacts?

- Visitors may download and install the malware, or execute the malicious script to have their devices hacked
- Original content may be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner may be damaged
- Server may be further compromised to perform other hacking or even criminal activities

URL/IP ratio of Malware Hosting security events




Figure 10: URL/IP ratio of Malware Hosting security events

What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?


- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

- CleanMX Malware
- Malc0de
- MalwareDomainList

4 Botnet

4.1 Botnets Command & Control Centers (C&C)



Trend and distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

Figure 11: Trend and distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

What is a Botnet Command & Control Center?

 Botnet Command & Control Center is a server used by cybercriminals to control the bots, which are compromised computers, by sending them commands to perform malicious activities, e.g. stealing personal financial information or launching DDoS attacks

What are the potential impacts?

- A server may be heavily loaded when many bots connect to it
- A server may have a large amount of personal and financial data stolen

Sources of Information:

• Shadowserver - C&Cs

4.2 Botnets (Bots)

4.2.1 Major Botnet Families

Major Botnet families are selected botnet families with a considerable amount of security events reported from the information sources consistently across the reporting period.

Individual botnet's size is calculated from the maximum of the daily counts of unique IP address attempting to connect to the botnet in the reporting period. In other words, the real botnet size should be larger because not all bots are activated on the same day.





Figure 12: Major Botnet families in Hong Kong network

| Rank | ↑↓ | Concerned Bots | Number of Unique | Changes with |
|------|---------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | | | IP addresses | previous period |
| 1 | \rightarrow | Mirai | 3,969 | -11.3% |
| 2 | ↑ | WannaCry | 513 | 13.0% |
| 3 | ↑ | Conficker | 400 | -7.4% |
| 4 | \Downarrow | Avalanche | 345 | -56.3% |
| 5 | ↑ | Virut | 160 | -6.4% |
| 6 | ↑ | Sality | 97 | -27.1% |
| 7 | \Downarrow | Nymaim | 87 | -78.4% |
| 8 | ↑ | VPNFilter | 72 | 0.0% |
| 9 | ↑ | Tinba | 51 | 37.8% |
| 10 | \rightarrow | Necurs | 43 | -18.9% |

| Tab | le 3: Major | Botnet fam | ilies in Hong | Kong network |
|-----|-------------|------------|---------------|--------------|
| | | | | |



Trend of 5 Botnet families in Hong Kong network

Figure 13: Trend of top 5 Botnet families in Hong Kong network

| Table 4: Trend of top 5 Botnet families in Hong Kong network | | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
| Name | 2019 Q2 | 2019 Q3 | 2019 Q4 | 2020 Q1 | 2020 Q2 | |
| Mirai | 4,432 | 4,594 | 4,231 | 4,474 | 3,969 | |
| WannaCry | 813 | 697 | 354 | 454 | 513 | |
| Conficker | 594 | 508 | 476 | 432 | 400 | |
| Avalanche | 222 | 277 | 1,333 | 790 | 345 | |
| Virut | 299 | 332 | 175 | 171 | 160 | |

Table 4. Trend of top 5. Date at families in Llong Kang natural

What is a Botnet (Bots)?

 A Botnet (Bots) is usually a personal computer that is infected by malicious software to become part of a botnet. Once infected, the malicious software usually hides itself, and stealthily connects to the Command & Control Server to get instructions from the hackers.

What are the potential impacts?

- · Computers may be commanded to perform other hacking or criminal activities
- Computer owner's personal and financial data may be stolen which may lead to financial loss
- Commands from hackers may lead to other malicious activities, e.g. spreading malicious software or launching DDoS attacks

Sources of Information:

- ShadowServer botnet_drone
- ShadowServer sinkhole_http_drone
- Shadowserver Microsoft_sinkhole

Appendix

A Sources of information in IFAS

The following information feeds are information sources of IFAS:

| Event Type | Table 5: IFAS Sources of Information Source | First introduced |
|-----------------|--|------------------|
| | | |
| Defacement | Zone - H | 2013-04 |
| Phishing | CleanMX - Phishing | 2013-04 |
| Phishing | Phishtank | 2013-04 |
| Malware Hosting | CleanMX - Malware | 2013-04 |
| Malware Hosting | Malc0de | 2013-04 |
| Malware Hosting | MalwareDomainList | 2013-04 |
| Botnet (C&Cs) | Shadowserver - C&Cs | 2013-09 |
| Botnet (Bots) | Shadowserver - botnet_drone | 2013-08 |
| Botnet (Bots) | Shadowserver - sinkhole_http_drone | 2013-08 |
| Botnet (Bots) | Shadowserver - microsoft_sinkhole | 2013-08 |

B Geolocation identification methods in IFAS

We use the following methods to identify if a network's geolocation is in Hong Kong:

Table 6: Methods of Geolocation IdentificationMethodFirst introducedLast updateMaxmind2013-042020-08

C Major Botnet Families

| Major Botnets | Alias | Nature | Infection Method | Attacks / Impacts |
|---------------|---|----------------------------|--|---|
| Avalanche | Nil | Crimeware-as- a-service | Depends on underlying malwares | Send spams Host phishing sites Host malware Steal sensitive information |
| Bamital | Nil | Trojan | Drive-by download via exploit kit Via P2P network | Click fraudSearch hijacking |
| BankPatch | MultiBankerPatcherBankPatcher | Banking Trojan | Via adult web sites Corrupt multimedia codecs Spam e-mail Chat and messaging systems | Monitor specific banking websites and harvest user's passwords, credit card information and other sensitive financial data |
| Bedep | Nil | Trojan | Via adult web sitesMalvertising | Click fraudDownload other malwares |
| BlackEnergy | Nil | DDoS Trojan | Rootkit techniques to maintain persistence Uses process injection technique Strong encryption and modular architecture | Launch DDoS attacks |
| Citadel | Nil | Banking Trojan | Avoid and disable security tool detection | Steal banking credentials and sensitive information Keystroke logging Screenshot capture Video capture Man-in-the-browser attack Ransomware |
| Conficker | DownadupKido | Worm | Domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability Communicate via P2P network Disable security software | Exploit the Windows Server Service vulnerability (MS08-067) Brute force attacks for admin credential to spread across network Spread via removable drives using "autorun" feature |

| Major Botnets | Alias | Nature | et Families (cont.) Infection Method | Attacks / Impacts |
|---------------|--|---------------------|---|--|
| Corebot | Nil | Banking Trojan | Via droppers | Steal sensitiveinformationInstall other malware |
| | | | | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access |
| Dyre | Nil | Banking Trojan | • Spam e-mail | Steal banking credential by tricking the victim to call an illegitimate number Send spams |
| Gamarue | Andromeda | Downloader/ Worm | Via exploit kit Spam e-mail MS Word macro Removable-drives | Steal sensitive information Allow unauthorised access Install other malware |
| Ghost Push | Nil | Mobile malware | Via app installation | Gain root accessDownload other malware |
| Glupteba | Nil | Trojan | Drive-by download via Blackhole Exploit Kit | Push contextual advertising and clickjacking to victims |
| IRC Botnet | Nil | Trojan | Communicate via IRC network | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access Launch DDoS attack Send spams |
| Mirai | Nil | Worm | Telnet with vendor default credentials | Launch DDoS attacks |
| Murofet | Nil | Trojan | File infectionVia exploit kits | Download other malware |
| Nivdort | Nil | Trojan | Spam e-mail | Steal login credentials and sensitive information |
| Nymaim | Nil | Trojan | Spam e-mailMalicious link | Lock infected systems Stop victims from accessing files Ask for ransom |
| Matsnu | Nil | Trojan | • Spam e-mail | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access Lock infected systems Encrypt user data Ask for ransom |
| Palevo | Rimecud Butterfly bot Pilleuz Mariposa Vaklik | Worm | Spread via instant messaging, P2P network and removable drives | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access Steal login credentials and sensitive information Steal money directly from banks using money mules |

| Major Botnets | Alias | Nature | net Families (cont.) Infection Method | Attacks / Impacts |
|---------------|---|----------------|--|---|
| Pushdo | Cutwail Pandex | Downloader | Hiding its malicious network traffic Domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability Distribute via drive by download Exploit browser and plugins' vulnerabilities | Download other banking malware (e.g. Zeus and Spyeye) Launch DDoS attacks Send spams |
| Ramnit | Nil | Worm | File infection Via exploit kits Public FTP servers | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access Steal login credentials and sensitive information |
| Sality | Nil | Trojan | Rootkit techniques to maintain persistence Communicate via P2P network Spread via removable drives and shares Disable security software Use polymorphic and entry point obscuring (EPO) techniques to infect files | Send spams Proxying of communications Steal sensitive information Compromise web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking) Install other malware |
| Slenfbot | Nil | Worm | Spread via removable drives and shares | Backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorised access Download financial malware Sending spam Launch DDoS attacks |
| Tinba | TinyBankerZusy | Banking Trojan | Via exploit kitSpam e-mail | Steal banking credential and sensitive information |
| Torpig | SinowalAnserin | Trojan | Rootkit techniques to maintain persistence (Mebroot rootkit) Domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability Distribute via drive by download | Steal sensitive information Man in the browser attack |

| Major Botnets | Alias | Nature | Infection Method | Attacks / Impacts |
|----------------------|---|----------------|---|--|
| Virut | Nil | Trojan | Spread via removable drives and shares | Send spams Launch DDoS attacks Fraud Data theft |
| VPNFilter | Nil | Worm | Possibly exploit device vulnerabilities | Launch network attacks Leak network traffic flowing through the infected devices Disrupt Internet connection |
| WannaCry | • WannaCrypt | Ransomware | Spread across network Exploit Windows SMB vulnerabilities | Encrypt user dataDemand ransomData unrecoverable |
| Wapomi | Nil | Worm | Spread via removable drives and shares Infects executable files | Backdoor capabilities Download and drop additional destructive payloads Alter important files causing unreliable system performance Gather computer activity, transmit private data and cause sluggish computer |
| ZeroAccess | Max++Sirefef | Trojan | Rootkit techniques to maintain persistence Communicate via P2P network Distribute via drive by download Distribute via disguise as legitimate file (eg. media files, keygen) | Download other malware Bitcoin mining and click fraud |
| Zeus | Gameover | Banking Trojan | Stealthy techniques to maintain persistence Distribute via drive by download Communicate via P2P network | Steal banking credential and sensitive information Man in the browser attack Keystroke logging Download other malware (eg. Cryptolocker) Launch DDoS attacks |