

Hong Kong Security Watch Report

2018 Q3

Foreword

Better Security Decision with Situational Awareness

Nowadays, a lot of "invisible" compromised systems (computers and other devices) are controlled by attackers with the owner being unaware. The data on these systems may be mined and exposed every day, and the systems may be utilized in different kinds of abuse and criminal activities. The Hong Kong Security Watch Report aims to provide the public a better "visibility" of the situation of the compromised systems in Hong Kong so that they can make better decision in protecting their information security.

The data in this report is about the activities of compromised systems in Hong Kong which suffer from, or participate in various forms of cyber attacks, including web defacement, phishing, malware hosting, botnet command and control centres (C&C) or bots. Computers in Hong Kong are defined as those whose network geolocation is Hong Kong, or the top level domain of their host name is ".hk".

Capitalizing on the Power of Global Intelligence

This report is the fruit of the collaboration of HKCERT and global security researchers. Many security researchers have the capability to detect attacks targeting their own or their customers' networks. Some of them provide the information of IP addresses of attack source or web links of malicious activities to other information security organizations with an aim to collaboratively improve the overall security of the cyberspace. They have good practice in sanitizing personal identifiable data before sharing information.

HKCERT collects and aggregates such valuable data about Hong Kong from multiple information sources for analysis with Information Feed Analysis System (IFAS), a system developed by HKCERT. The information sources (Appendix 1) are very distributed and reliable, providing a balanced reflection of the security status of Hong Kong.

We remove duplicated events reported by multiple sources and use the following metrics for measurement to assure the quality of statistics.

Better information better service

We will continue to enhance this report with more valuable information sources and more in-depth analysis. We will also explore how to use the data to enhance our services. Please send us your feedback via email (hkcert@hkcert.org).

Limitations

The data collected in this report is from multiple different sources with different collection method, collection period, presentation format and their own limitations. The numbers from the report should be used as a reference, and should neither be compared directly nor be regarded as a full picture of the reality.

Type of Attack	Metric used
Defacement, Phishing,	security events on unique URLs within the
Malware Hosting	reporting period
Botnet (C&Cs)	security events on unique IP addresses within
	the reporting period
Botnet (Bots)	maximum daily count of security events on
	unique IP addresses within the reporting period

Disclaimer

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¹Major Botnet Families are selected botnet families with considerable amount of security events reported from the information sources constantly across the reporting period.

Highlight of Report

This report is for 2018 Q3.

In 2018 Q3, there were 24,118 unique security events related to Hong Kong used for analysis in this report. The information is collected with IFAS² from 13 sources of information.³ They are not from the incidents reports received by HKCERT.




Figure 1: Trend of security events

Event Type	2017 Q3	2017 Q4	2018 Q1	2018 Q2	2018 Q3
Defacement	1,060	1,324	824	1,071	5,439
Phishing	1,100	449	634	34,391	319
Malware Hosting	1,226	1,270	649	$4,\!359$	7,773

The total number of security events in 2018 Q3 fell by 49% or 23,016 events compared to the previous quarter. The decrease was mostly contributed by the dropdown of phishing events by 99%, while the malware hosting and defacement events jumped up by 78% and 408% respectively. Despite the decrease in last quarter, comparing with 2017 Q3 to 2018 Q1, we still got a surge in the overall events by 183% to 211%.

Server related security events

Server related security events include malware hosting, phishing and defacement. Their trends and distributions are summarized below:

²IFAS - Information Feed Analysis System is a HKCERT developed system that collects global security intelligence relating to Hong Kong to provide a picture of the security status.

³Refer to Appendix 1 for the sources of information

Trend and Distribution of server related security events




Figure 2: Trend and distribution of server related security events

The number of phishing events got drastic drop from 34,391 in Q2 to 319 in Q3, or 99% decrease. While the number of defacement events jumped up from 1,071 in Q2 to 5,439 in Q3, or 408% increase. The top IP is 103.73.66.10, registered under AS36351 (HostHatch Hong Kong). It is noted that this IP has contributed 4,493 events since 29 September 2018, and HKCERT has notified the affected operator to clean up the defaced content and fix any vulnerabilities in their server.

The number of malware events got relatively smaller increase from 4,359 in Q2 to 7,773 in Q3, or 78% increase. Among these events, each of them involved a unique malware URL. The top 2 IPs are 43.226.125.19 and 112.213.126.51. The both IPs were registered under AS38197 (Sun Network).

The drastic drop of number of mass phishing events caused its URL/IP ratio to drop from 15 to 3. It can be seen that much fewer servers (dropped from 2,242 in 2018 Q2 to 117 in 2018 Q3) were breached/abused for phishing activities in 2018 Q3.

On the other hand, the URL/IP ratios of defacement and malware hosting events increased. For defacement events, the URL/IP ratio rose up from 3 to 8. It is because the IP 103.73.66.10 (AS36351 HostHatch Hong Kong) has hosted 4,493 unique defacement URLs. On the other hand, the number of unique defacement IPs increased from 392 to 697, or by 78%. If excluding these unique URLs from the IP 103.73.66.10, the number of unique defacement URLs is only 934. Therefore, it can be seen that more number of servers were breached/abused for defacement activities in 2018 Q3.

For malware hosting events, the URL/IP ratio continued to rise up from 36 to 56. The cause of it is because the number of unique malware hosting URLs increased from 4,359 to 7,773, or by 78%, while the increase of number of unique malware hosting IPs increased only from 121 to 140, which was not comparable with that of the number of unique URLs. It can be seen that the small number of breached/abused servers contributed large number of URL for malware hosting.

HKCERT urges system and application administrators to protect the servers



- patch server up-to-date to avoid the known vulnerabilities being exploited
- update web application and plugins to the latest version
- follow best practice on user account and password management
- implement validation check for user input and system output
- provide strong authentication e.g. two factor authentication, administrative control interface
- acquire information security knowledge to prevent social engineering

Botnet related security events

Botnet related security events can be classified into two categories:

- Botnet Command and Control Centers (C&C) security events involving small number of powerful computers, mostly servers, which give commands to bots
- Botnet security events involving large number of computers, mostly home computers which receive commands from C&Cs.

Botnet Command and Control Servers

The trend of botnet C&C security events is summarized below:

Trend of Botnet (C&C) security events




Figure 3: Trend of Botnet (C&Cs) security events

There was no Command and Control Server reported in this quarter.

Botnet Bots

The trend of botnet (bots) security events is summarized below:

Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events




Figure 4: Trend of Botnet (Bots) security events

The number of Botnet (bots) in Hong Kong network increased by 45% in 2018 Q3. Mirai contributed to the increase of total count of Botnets by 116%, and keeps the first place in the rank of Major Botnet Families in Hong Kong Networks. There is a note that Ramnit has decreased by 41%, with the number of unique IP address decreased from 90 in 2018 Q2 to 53 in 2018 Q3.

Mirai botnet became active at the end of 2016. Following our cleanup operation in early 2017, we saw a decrease in Mirai events in 2017. However, Mirai botnet became active again since the end of 2017. New IoT devices were targeted. Counting the ports being scanned by infected IP addresses in each quarter, we see the steady falling trend for ports 23 (3,645 in Q4 2017 vs 3,242 in Q3 2018) and 2323 (1,502 in Q4 2017 vs 962 in Q3 2018), but seeing a surge in port 5555 (1 in Q4 2017 vs 126,724 in Q3 2018). According to Kaspersky research⁴, ports 23 and 2323 are the target ports of the original Mirai variant. But in February and July 2018, we began to see reports of ports 5555 being targeted^{5 6 7}. Port 5555 is the default port used by the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) for development purpose. It was found that many devices have this port open to the Internet. Attackers become interested in scanning for this port to find any vulnerable Android devices. HKCERT will keep monitoring on the trend and continue the cleanup.

⁴https://securelist.com/new-trends-in-the-world-of-iot-threats/87991/

 $^{^5} http://blog.netlab.360.com/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-and roid-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading-en/add$

⁶https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Worm+Mirai+Exploiting+Android+Debug+Bridge+Port+5555tcp/23856/

 $^{^{7}} https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/open-adb-ports-being-exploited-to-spread-possible-satori-variant-in-android-devices/$

HKCERT urges users to protect computers so as not to become part of the botnets



- patch their computers
- install a working copy of the security software and scan for malware on their machines
- set strong passwords to avoid credential based attack
- do not use Windows, media files and software that have no proper licenses
- do not use Windows and software that have no security updates
- do not open files from unreliable sources

HKCERT has been following up the security events received and proactively engaged local ISPs for the botnet clean up since June 2013. Currently, botnet cleanup operations against major botnet family WannaCry, Avalanche, XCodeGhost, Pushdo, Citadel, Mumblehard, Ramnit, ZeroAccess and GameOver Zeus are still in action.

HKCERT urges general users to join the cleanup acts. Ensure your computers are not being infected and controlled by malicious software. Protect yourself and keep the cyberspace clean.

Users can use the HKCERT guideline to detect and clean up botnets



- Botnet Detection and Cleanup Guideline
- \bullet https://www.hkcert.org/botnet

Report Details

1 Defacement

1.1 Summary

Trend of Defacement security events




Figure 5: Trend of Defacement security events



What is defacement?

• Defacement is the unauthorized alteration of the content of a legitimate website using hacking method.

What are the potential impacts?

- The integrity of the website content is damaged.
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might be damaged
- Other information stored/processed on the server mightbe further compromised by the hack to performed other attacks.

URL/IP ratio of Defacement security events



Figure 6: URL/IP ratio of defacement security events



What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

• Zone-H

2 Phishing

2.1 Summary

Trend of Phishing security events




Figure 7: Trend of Phishing security events



What is Phishing?

• Phishing is the spoofing of a legitimate website for fraudulent purposes

What are the potential impacts?

- Personal information or accout credentials of visitors might be stolen, leading to financial loss.
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might the damaged
- Server might be further compromised to perform other attacks

URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events




Figure 8: URL/IP ratio of Phishing security events



What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

- CleanMX phishing
- Phishtank

3 Malware Hosting

3.1 Summary

Trend of Malware security events




Figure 9: Trend of Malware Hosting security events



What is Malware Hosting?

• Malware Hosting is the dispatching of malware on a website

What are the potential impacts?

- Visitors might download and install the malware, or execute the malicious script to get compromised
- Original content might be inaccessible
- Reputation of the website owner might the damaged
- Server might be further compromised to perform other criminal activities

URL/IP ratio of Malware security events




Figure 10: URL/IP ratio of Malware Hosting security events



What is URL/IP ratio?

• It is the number of security events count in unique URL divided by the number of security events count in unique IP addresses

What can this ratio indicate?

- Number of events counted in unique URL cannot reflect the number of compromised servers, since one server may contain many URL
- Number of events counted in unique IP address can be better related to the number of compromised servers
- The higher the ratio is, the more mass compromise happened

Sources of Information:

- Abuse.ch:Zeus Tracker Binary URL
- CleanMX Malware
- Malc0de
- MalwareDomainList

4 Botnet

4.1 Botnets - Command & Control Servers

Trend and Distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events




Figure 11: Trend and Distribution of Botnet (C&Cs) security events



What is a Botnet Command & Control Center?

• A Botnet Command & Control Center is a server used by cybercriminals to control the bots, which are compromised computers, by sending them commands to perform malicious activities, e.g. stealing personal financial information or launching DDoS attacks

What are the potential impacts?

- Server might be heavily loaded when many bots connect to it
- Server might contain large amount of personal and financial data stolen by other bots

Sources of Information:

- Zeus Tracker
- Palevo Tracker
- Shadowserver C&Cs

4.2 Botnets - Bots

4.2.1 Major Botnet Families⁸

Individual botnet's size is calculated from the maximum of the daily counts of unique IP address attempting to connect to the botnet in the report period. In other words, the real botnet size should be larger because not all bots are powered on the same day.




Figure 12: Major Botnet Families in Hong Kong Networks

⁸Major Botnet Families are selected botnet families with considerable amount of security events reported from the information sources constantly across the reporting period.

Table 2: Major Botnet Families in Hong Kong Networks

Rank	ΛΨ	Concerned Bots	Number of Unique	Changes with
			IP addresses	previous period
1	\rightarrow	Mirai	7,205	115.7%
2	\rightarrow	WannaCry	1,364	-23.6%
3	\rightarrow	Conficker	651	-13.4%
4	\rightarrow	Virut	313	-20.6%
5	\uparrow	Avalanche	254	34.4%
6	\Downarrow	Sality	181	-5.2%
7	\rightarrow	VPNFilter	120	20.0%
8	\uparrow	Zeus	64	6.7%
9	\uparrow	Murofet	59	-3.3%
10	\Downarrow	Ramnit	53	-41.1%

Trend of 5 Botnet Families in Hong Kong Network




Figure 13: Trend of Top 5 Botnet Families in Hong Kong Network

Name	2017 Q3	2017 Q4	2018 Q1	2018 Q2	2018 Q3
Mirai	558	611	2,291	3,340	7,205
WannaCry	1,959	2,001	1,510	1,786	1,364
Conficker	1,341	1,180	838	752	651
Virut	5	5	311	394	313
Avalanche	281	246	241	189	254



What is a Botnet - Bot?

• A bot is usually a personal computer that is infected by malicious software to become part of a botnet. Once infected, the malicious software usually hides itself, and stealthily connects to the Command & Control Server to get instructions from hackers.

What are the potential impacts?

- Computer owner's personal and financial data might be stolen which may lead to financial loss.
- Computers might be commanded to perform other criminal activities.

Sources of Information:

- ShadowServer botnet_drone
- ShadowServer sinkhole_http_drone
- Shadowserver Microsoft_sinkhole

Appendix

A Sources of information in IFAS

The following information feeds are information sources of IFAS:

Table 3: IFAS Sources of Information

Event Type	Source	First introduced
Defacement	Zone - H	2013-04
Phishing	CleanMX - Phishing	2013-04
Phishing	Phishtank	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - Binary URL	2013-04
Malware Hosting	CleanMX - Malware	2013-04
Malware Hosting	Malc0de	2013-04
Malware Hosting	MalwareDomainList	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Abuse.ch: Zeus Tracker - C&Cs	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Abuse.ch: Palevo Tracker - C&Cs	2013-04
Botnet (C&Cs)	Shadowserver - C&Cs	2013-09
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - botnet_drone	2013-08
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - sinkhole_http_drone	2013-08
Botnet (Bots)	Shadowserver - microsoft_sinkhole	2013-08

B Geolocation identification methods in IFAS

We use the following methods to identify if a network's geolocation is in Hong Kong:

Table 4: Methods of Geolocation Identification						
Method	First introduced	Last update				
Maxmind	2013-04	2018-10-3				

C Major Botnet Families

Table	5.	Rotnet	Families	
Table) .	DOLLIEL	rannes	

Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Avalanche	Nil	Crimeware-as- a-service	• Depends on underlying malwares	 send spams host phishing sites host malware steal sensitive information
Bamital	Nil	Trojan	 drive-by download via exploit kit via P2P network	 Click fraud Search hijacking
BankPatch	MultiBankerPatcherBankPatcher	Banking Trojan	 via adult web sites corrupt multimedia codecs spam e-mail chat and messaging systems 	• monitor specific banking websites and harvest user's passwords, credit card information and other sensitive financial data
Bedep	Nil	Trojan	via adult web sitesmalvertising	Click frauddownload other malwares
BlackEnergy	Nil	DDoS Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence uses process injection technique strong encryption and modular architecture 	• launch DDoS attacks
Citadel	Nil	Banking Trojan	• avoid and disable security tool detection	 steal banking credentials and sensitive information keystroke logging screenshot capture video capture man-in-the-browser attack ransomware
Conficker	DownadupKido	Worm	 domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability communicate via P2P network disable security software 	 exploit the Windows Server Service vulnerability (MS08-067) brute force attacks for admin credential to spread across network spread via removable drives using "autorun" feature

Table 6: Botnet Families (cont.)

Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Corebot	Nil	Banking Trojan	• via droppers	 steal sensitive information install other malware backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access
Dyre	Nil	Banking Trojan	• spam e-mail	 steal banking credential by tricking the victim to call an illegitimate number send spams
Gamarue	Andromeda	Downloader/ Worm	 via exploit kit spam e-mail MS Word macro removable-drives 	 steal sensitive information allow unauthorized access install other malware
Ghost Push	Nil	Mobile malware	• via app installation	gain root accessdownload other malware
Glupteba	Nil	Trojan	• drive-by download via Blackhole Exploit Kit	• push contextual advertising and clickjacking to victims
IRC Botnet	Nil	Trojan	• communicate via IRC network	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access launch DDoS attack send spams
Mirai	Nil	Worm	• telnet with vendor default credentials	• launch DDoS attacks
Murofet	Nil	Trojan	file infectionvia exploit kits	• download other malware
Nivdort	Nil	Trojan	• spam e-mail	• steal login credentials and sensitive information
Nymaim	Nil	Trojan	spam e-mailmalicious link	 lock infected systems stop victims from accessing files ask for ransom
Palevo	 Rimecud Butterfly Pilleuz Mariposa Vaklik 	Worm	• spread via instant messaging, P2P network and removable drives	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access steal login credentials and sensitive information steal money directly from banks using money mules

Table 7: Botnet Families (cont.)

Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Pushdo	CutwailPandex	Downloader	 hiding its malicious network traffic domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability distribute via drive by download exploit browser and plugins' vulnerabilities 	 download other banking malware (e.g. Zeus and Spyeye) launch DDoS attacks send spams
Ramnit	Nil	Worm	 file infection via exploit kits public FTP servers 	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access steal login credentials and sensitive information
Sality	Nil	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence communicate via P2P network spread via removable drives and shares disable security software use polymorphic and entry point obscuring (EPO) techniques to infect files 	 send spams proxying of communications steal sensitive information compromise web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking) install other malware
Slenfbot	Nil	Worm	• spread via removable drives and shares	 backdoor capabilities that allow unauthorized access download financial malware sending spam launch DDoS attacks
Tinba	TinyBankerZusy	Banking Trojan	via exploit kitSpam e-mail	• steal banking credential and sensitive information
Torpig	SinowalAnserin	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence (Mebroot rootkit) domain generation algorithm (DGA) capability distribute via drive by download 	 steal sensitive information man in the browser attack

Table 8: Botnet Families (cont.)

Major Botnets	Alias	Nature	Infection Method	Attacks / Impacts
Virut	Nil	Trojan	• spread via removable drives and shares	send spamslaunch DDoS attacksfrauddata theft
VPNFilter	Nil	Worm	• possibly exploit device vulnerabilities	 launch network attacks leak network traffic flowing through the infected devices disrupt Internet connection
WannaCry	• WannaCrypt	Ransomware	spread across networkexploit Windows SMB vulnerabilities	encrypt user datademand ransomdata unrecoverable
Wapomi	Nil	Worm	 spread via removable drives and shares infects executable files 	 backdoor capabilities download and drop additional destructive payloads alter important files causing unreliable system performance gather computer activity, transmit private data and cause sluggish computer
ZeroAccess	max++Sirefef	Trojan	 rootkit techniques to maintain persistence communicate via P2P network distribute via drive by download distribute via disguise as legitimate file (eg. media files, keygen) 	 download other malware bitcoin mining and click fraud
Zeus	• Gameover	Banking Trojan	 stealthy techniques to maintain persistence distribute via drive by download communicate via P2P network 	 steal banking credential and sensitive information man in the browser attack keystroke logging download other malware (eg. Cryptolocker) launch DDoS attacks